Research

The new lease standard (ASC 842) allows firms to keep variable leases off balance sheet, in part based on the assumption that future expenses are difficult to estimate reliably. We show that variable lease expenses are both prevalent and substantial, exhibiting persistence and predictability comparable to operating lease expenses while showing limited sensitivity to revenue changes. These patterns are consistent with variable lease payments being based on stable drivers. Following ASC 842 adoption, firms report lower minimum operating lease commitments and higher variable lease expenses, suggesting a substitution from operating to variable leases. Neither equity betas nor credit ratings reflect potential variable lease liabilities. Conservative estimates show that recognition of variable lease liabilities would increase debt by 7.1\% on average. Our findings provide evidence on the properties of variable leases and the potential implications of keeping them off balance sheet.

We examine whether and how investors shape the information environment of private firms through media coverage. Using a stacked difference-in-differences design, we find that media attention to startups increases significantly following venture capital (VC) investment. This effect is stronger when portfolio companies are backed by VCs located in media-dense regions, by high-reputation investors, and at early stages of development. We also show that increased media exposure is associated with improved startup outcomes, including a higher likelihood of raising subsequent financing and attracting higher-quality employees. To complement the archival analysis, we conduct a global survey of 399 VC investors across 382 firms. The majority report taking active steps to enhance portfolio company visibility, motivated by goals such as branding, talent acquisition, and stakeholder communication. Together, our findings suggest that media visibility serves as an important channel through which investors reduce information frictions in opaque private markets.

This study examines the role of congressional investigations in detecting corporate misconduct. Using data on all hearings from 2002 to 2020 involving U.S. firms, I document that investigated firms are more likely to record increased regulatory violations within two years of testimony relative to non-investigated firms. Cross-sectional analyses show that hearings that produce more information and attract greater media coverage are associated with stronger enforcement responses. These responses extend beyond the focal issues raised in testimony to unrelated violation categories, suggesting the attention channel broadens regulatory scrutiny beyond the initial issue. Hearings are also followed by increases in scheduled inspections, whistleblower initiated, and agency referred investigations. Together, the evidence indicates that congressional investigations are linked to more expansive and intensive regulatory scrutiny and enforcement, highlighting their role as a political process that can strengthen corporate oversight.