Research

This study examines the role of congressional investigations on corporate misconduct detection. Using data on U.S. firm-level hearings from 2000–2020, I document that investigated firms are 12.2% more likely to record increased regulatory violations within two years of testimony. Cross-sectional analyses show that hearings producing more information and attracting greater public attention are associated with stronger enforcement responses. These responses extend beyond the focal issues raised in testimony to unrelated violation categories, consistent with spillover patterns that broaden regulatory scrutiny. Hearings are also followed by increases in scheduled inspections and whistleblower-initiated investigations, suggesting that congressional investigations politically legitimizes heightened oversight. Political connectedness and strong internal controls do not appear to attenuate these associations. Together, the evidence indicates that congressional investigations are linked to more expansive and intensive regulatory scrutiny, highlighting their role as a political process that channels attention, information, and legitimacy into corporate oversight.

The new lease standard (ASC 842) allows firms to keep variable leases off balance sheet, in part based on the assumption that future expenses are difficult to estimate reliably. We show that variable lease expenses are both prevalent and substantial, exhibiting persistence and predictability comparable to operating lease expenses while showing limited sensitivity to revenue changes. These patterns are consistent with variable lease payments being based on stable drivers. Following ASC 842 adoption, firms report lower minimum operating lease commitments and higher variable lease expenses, suggesting a substitution from operating to variable leases. Neither equity betas nor credit ratings reflect potential variable lease liabilities. Conservative estimates show that recognition of variable lease liabilities would increase debt by 7.1\% on average. Our findings provide evidence on the properties of variable leases and the potential implications of keeping them off balance sheet.

We examine whether and how investors shape the information environment of private firms through media coverage. Using a stacked difference-in-differences design, we find that media attention to startups increases significantly following venture capital (VC) investment. This effect is stronger when portfolio companies are backed by VCs located in media-dense regions, by high-reputation investors, and at early stages of development. We also show that increased media exposure is associated with improved startup outcomes, including a higher likelihood of raising subsequent financing and attracting higher-quality employees. To complement the archival analysis, we conduct a global survey of 399 VC investors across 382 firms. The majority report taking active steps to enhance portfolio company visibility, motivated by goals such as branding, talent acquisition, and stakeholder communication. Together, our findings suggest that media visibility serves as an important channel through which investors reduce information frictions in opaque private markets.

In this project, we will investigate management practices regarding delegation that can help companies navigate different phases of growth. The relationship between varying degrees of delegation at different stages of the company’s life cycle and how it impacts a company’s future growth. Additionally, we will investigate various management levers and information systems that the company can institute to complement the effectiveness of its centralization vs. delegation decisions. Leveraging a combination of datasets from the U.S. Census, we will investigate these relationships and questions in the context of manufacturing firms. The manufacturing industry is ideal for our study due to its clear, recurring decision points, economic significance, and the ability to observe granular, well-defined performance metrics and outputs. Combining this data with firm fundamental data obtained from other U.S. Census sources, we will report various summary statistics and perform various regression analyses to understand the following questions: (1) To what extent do varying degrees of delegation affect a company’s future growth at different stages of the company’s life cycle? (2) To what extent and under what circumstances do organizations adjust the degree of delegation to navigate different stages of growth? (3) What management systems can complement or substitute for delegation throughout the life cycle of the company? (4) When do ventures start to formalize management systems (especially those specified above)? How does the introduction of these systems affect the degree of delegation at different stages of growth?